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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates how privatisation trends have affected the right to social 
security in the UK since 1979. Privatisation has regularly been posited as a solution to 
more efficiently and effectively target public services. However, the procedural effects 
of social security privatisation have been the opposite, with increased social spending 
accompanied by poorly targeted provision. Those able to wield democratic influence 
and consumer interests over legislative entitlement have disproportionately benefited 
from increased social security efforts. This paper illustrates that a confluence of factors 
affect the right to social security within and beyond substantive privatisation processes. 
Whilst the, albeit gradual, diversification of social security has proven critical, the 
principles underpinning such developments have proven far more significant in 
informing and threatening the right to social security for those who most need it. 
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Introduction 
 
Since 1979, successive UK political administrations have remained steadfast in their 
commitment to diversify the funding, provision and regulation of public services. As a 
result, welfare pluralism has become an increasingly prominent feature of UK social 
policy (Hills, 2011). In both public and academic discourse, this process is often 
labelled ‘privatisation’ and is considered synonymous with welfare withdrawal 
(Beresford and Croft, 1983; Gamble, 1992; Self, 2000; Hutton, 2011). However, to 
characterise this process as a linear transition from public to private welfare, obscures 
the multidimensional nature of welfare pluralism. Much of the existing analysis still 
rests on a binary distinction between private and public welfare (e.g. Dorfman and 
Harel, 2013). Walker (1984) concedes that his own analysis is ‘based on a comparison 
between the two extremes of the formal services continuum’ (Walker, 1984: 34). Some 
have resigned themselves to ‘set aside the essentially uncertain predictions about the 
consequences of privatisation and to refocus the debate on the real political and 
theoretical disagreements at issue’ (Dilley, 2000: 982). Whilst a necessary step in 
understanding the effects of privatisation, this renders the privatisation debate 
empirically impoverished and does little to engage with the actualities of welfare 
pluralism and its effect on social rights. 
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Rather than a linear transition from the State to the Market, ‘varieties of 
privatisation and marketisation’ (Clarke, 2004) have altered the welfare landscape 
alongside increased public social expenditure (Burchardt, 2013). Some have 
suggested that the term ‘privatisation’ is in itself problematic and does little to explain 
the diversity and complexity of welfare pluralism (Murphy et al., 1998; Drakeford and 
Campling, 2000; Powell and Miller, 2014). New public management prevails within 
certain policy domains and has increased state activity in certain instances through 
quasi-marketisation, targets and increased regulation (Banks, 2011). This paper then 
uses the term ‘privatisation’ to refer to a multiplicity of processes involved in the mixed 
economy of social security: the contracting-out of services; the marketisation of social 
insurance; the commercialisation of administrative discretion; payment by results; and 
so on. Making the theoretically defined phenomenon of welfare pluralism empirically 
tractable then is the most significant challenge to understanding the effects of 
privatisation. 
This paper comes at a particularly important conjuncture when a renewed zeal for 
privatisation has taken hold in the UK. A fresh round of public sector reform is 
underway against the backdrop of fiscal austerity (Cabinet Office, 2011). This paper 
explores how trends in social security privatisation have affected both the means and 
ends of welfare pluralism. Various studies have explored the effects of welfare 
pluralism on the right to healthcare and education (e.g. Pollock, 2006; Toebes, 2006; 
Kathleen, 2006). However, relatively little attention has been paid to privatisation 
processes affecting the right to social security. All domains of welfare activity have a 
significant bearing on social rights. However, the ability to fully exercise other social, 
civil and political rights is dependent on a minimum level of income (Torry, 2013). 
Without this, other rights become ‘empty moral possessions’ (Melden, 1979: 248). 
Social security then is the core welfare domain and the effects of privatisation 
processes are particularly important to understand.  
There are a number of apprehensions concerning the impact of welfare pluralism 
on the right to social security. Many consider social security to be a public good 
(Dorfman and Harel, 2013: 69) that collectivises and redistributes life risks (Esping-
Andersen, 1990: 40-43). With the introduction of market principles and/or private 
actors, social security becomes susceptible to profit logics that underpin market 
principles. If this occurs, social security administration and provision has the capacity 
to become socially stratified in a way that reflects, and perhaps propagates, existing 
inequalities and status differentials within the polity (Blomqvist, 2004). In this instance, 
the function and purpose of social security is compromised with resources no longer 
distributed according to social or moral objectives, such as meeting human need 
(Titmuss, 1968). This undermines the status of social security as a public good which 
is, of course, contested but at its most basic, intends to shelter people against life risks 
so that that they are able to secure a minimum income independently of the paid 
labour market. Essentially, privatisation has the potential to undermine the efficacy, 
function and purpose of social security such that the status and justiciability of the right 
to social security are compromised. Some have already explored how social security 
privatisation processes have affected welfare outcomes (e.g. Taylor-Gooby et al., 
2004). Analytical attention has been paid to particular features of social security 
privatisation such as pensions (e.g. Hyde et al., 2003). This paper builds upon such 
analysis to explore how privatisation trends in the regulation, finance and provision of 
social security have affected the right to social security since 1979.  
The paper begins by outlining how the substantive and procedural rights to social 
security have to be accounted for in order to fully understand the effects of 
privatisation. The paper then considers how the right to social security is variously 
constituted through moral, political and legal means and how the substantive right to 
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social security has fared since 1979. The paper then summarises the key privatisation 
trends in social security involving institutional as well as individual private actors. 
Examining the significance of private actors in the control, funding and provision of 
social security, the paper then explores how the right to social security has fared in the, 
albeit gradual, diversification of social security. The paper then illustrates how the 
changing distribution of social security receipt has come to reflect the logic 
underpinning welfare pluralism. As such, social security privatisation in its various 
procedural and institutional manifestations has weakened the capacity for social 
security to address rising poverty and inequality. The paper concludes that a 
‘privatisation ethos’ increases the mandate of those most able to exert consumer 
interests and democratic power to maximise the social security they receive. 
 
 
The right to social security  
 
Private funding, control and provision have the capacity to shape the mechanisms by 
which social goods are administered and in turn affect welfare outcomes. Social 
security primarily concerns the (re-) distribution of economic capital, but this is 
interpolated with a range of processes susceptible to welfare pluralism that can affect 
the justiciability and distributive efficacy of social security. There are differing, and 
often conflicting, accounts of what comprises the right to social security: ‘the whole 
range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to 
share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according 
to the standards prevailing in the society’ (Marshall, [1950] 1992: 8). Irrespective of 
whether a minimalist or maximalist conception is adopted, it will encompass 
substantive claims to social security as well as procedural rights in the administration 
and disbursement of social goods (Coote, 1992; Lister, 1998). In light of this, 
employing one definition or ‘benchmark’ of the right to social security proves 
problematic when exploring the effects of privatisation and welfare pluralism. In order 
to understand the effects of this trend, it is necessary to accommodate the different 
ways in which social security rights are conceived, administered and realised.  
The right to social security is fashioned from principles underpinning the provision 
and securement of welfare. This may entail a claim to welfare based on a principle of 
need, desert, equality and so on. This provides a moral basis from which to justify and 
realise the rights (and indeed, responsibilities) of citizenship. Contingent on the political 
paradigm in question, different principles will be drawn upon to codify claims to social 
security in law. The UK’s ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights is of symbolic and material significance here and the right to social 
security is reflected in a range of income entitlements for different groups (European 
Union, 2013). At its most basic, the right to social security entails access to a minimum 
income from the state so that human needs are met.1 Without possession of sufficient 
economic capital, the substantive right to social security is compromised.  
Before outlining privatisation trends since 1979, I will consider how the substantive 
right to social security has fared by looking at the changing prevalence of relative 
poverty in the UK. The proportion of people living below 60 per cent of median income 
(after housing costs) rose from 14 per cent in 1979 to 25 per cent in 1997 and has 
since fallen to 21 per cent in 2012 (Crawford et al., 2013). Despite substantial growth 
in social security spending, at least a fifth of the UK population has remained in relative 
poverty since 1987. There are many factors explaining this trend, including weakened 
predistribution instruments, structural unemployment and underemployment and rising 
income inequality (Shildrick et al., 2012; Joyce and Sibieta, 2013; Lansley, 2014). 
These factors are of central importance to understanding how and why the state has 
failed to fulfil the right to social security for a growing proportion of the UK population. 
p. 116. Social Security Privatisation in the UK: a means to whose end? 
© 2014 The Author People, Place and Policy (2014): 8/2, pp. 113-128 
Journal Compilation © 2014 PPP 
However, this paper focuses on policies and activities that enable citizens to secure a 
minimum income irrespective of their proximity to or engagement with the paid labour 
market. In this regard, there are three primary explanations for the prevalence of 
relative poverty and failure to fulfil the right to social security. 
Firstly, the provision and generosity of social security has become increasingly 
contingent on the socio-demographic, familial and employment status of benefit 
claimants. Under New Labour and now the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition 
government, social security efforts have been focused on pensioners, children and 
working families. From 1997 to 2012, pensioner poverty more than halved (from 29 to 
14 per cent), child poverty decreased from 34 to 27 per cent and working age parent 
poverty decreased from 27 to 23 per cent (Crawford et al., 2013). During the same 
period, working age non-parents lost out with the poverty rate increasing from 17 to 20 
per cent. Secondly, despite increased social expenditure, the relative value of certain 
benefits has fallen dramatically. Part of the explanation for this is that social security 
payments have struggled to keep pace with rising median incomes and the growing 
income share of the top ten per cent of earners (Joyce and Sibieta, 2013). Between 
1979 and 2012, the value of the basic state pension fell from 26 to 17.7 per cent of 
average earnings and unemployment benefit/job-seeker’s allowance fell from 20.6 to 
11.7 per cent. Between 1988 and 2012, the value of Income Support for single people 
aged over 25 fell from 15.3 to 11.7 per cent of average earnings (DWP, 2013). Finally, 
as illustrated later in this paper, social security payments have become increasingly 
less effective at targeting resources according to a principle of need. All this would 
suggest a cumulative degradation of the financial position of those reliant on social 
security to fulfil their basic and fuller needs. 
A trend towards welfare pluralism in the UK then is coupled with increasing poverty 
and state failure to enable all citizens, at least by virtue of their status, to participate 
according to the standards prevailing in society (Marshall, [1950] 1992). Having said 
that, trying to correlate social security privatisation trends with the right to a minimum 
income is a highly unsatisfactory account of how privatisation may be affecting the right 
to social security. The existing structures of social security provision (public or private) 
are moulded by privatisation principles. This of course has a bearing on social security 
outcomes and the substance of social rights, but it also has significant procedural 
effects of the right to a minimum income. I will now outline the key social security 
privatisation trends before considering their procedural effect on the right to social 
security.  
 
 
Social security privatisation: a variegated process 
 
This paper focuses on the ‘formal’ rather than the ‘informal’ aspects of social security. 
That is, the changing status of the right to a minimum income from the state rather 
than access to funds via clientelist kinship and support networks (Wood, 2004). As 
such, it is important to consider both working-age and pensioner benefits, but also the 
administrative structures that have a bearing on their disbursement. Acknowledging 
the multi-dimensional nature of privatisation, this paper examines the role and 
significance of private and public actors in the regulation, provision and finance of 
social security. Similarly to LeGrand and Robinson (1984) and Papadakis and Taylor-
Gooby (1987), Burchardt (1997) explores the changing role of private and public actors 
in the control, delivery and finance of welfare activity. Burchardt’s typology has been 
applied to four different time periods to examine who delivers, finances and controls 
welfare services, and also how these aspects of welfare activity coalesce to offer 
different combinations of welfare activity (Burchardt, 1997; Smithies, 2005; Edmiston, 
2011; Hills, 2011). This paper draws on data from the most recent assessment of how 
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public and private actors feature in social security activity in the UK (Edmiston, 2011). 
Within this typology, private actors include private organisations providing services in 
the administration and distribution of social security entitlements, but also individuals 
purchasing private welfare insurance. Both sets of private actors play a significant role 
in welfare pluralism and should both be included in any analysis of the effects of 
privatisation on the right to social security.  
Reviewing the evidence, it would appear that the shifting balance of welfare activity 
in social security has been gradual in the period running from 1979 to 2008 (see Table 
1). Total public spending on social security has decreased from 81 to 78 per cent of all 
spending on social security and total private spending has increased from 19 to 22 per 
cent. There have of course been fluctuations over the 29 year period, but overall, 
individual and institutional private actors now play a greater role in the domain of social 
security. 
 
Table 1: Welfare Activity: Spending (£billion, 2007-08 prices RPI adjusted) 
 
1979-80 1995-96 1999-00 2007-08 
Total Social Security Spending 113.0 174.4 179.2 239.3 
As a % of GDP 16.0% 16.5% 15.1% 16.7% 
Total Public Social Security Spending 91.1 147.0 146.8 186.4 
As a % of social security Spending 80.6% 84.3% 81.9% 77.9% 
As a % of GDP 12.9% 13.9% 12.3% 13.0% 
Total Private Social Security Spending 21.9 27.2 32.1 52.9 
As a % of social security Spending 19.4% 15.6% 17.9% 22.1% 
As a % of GDP 3.1% 2.6% 2.7% 3.7% 
Source: Edmiston (2011) 
 
 
The biggest driver of this trend is a diversification in the provision, finance and 
regulation of pensions. Designed to incentivise saving, state second pensions, 
occupational pensions and tax reliefs have had a profound effect on the welfare mix in 
social security. If pensions were to be excluded from social security spending, the vast 
majority of welfare activity would be publicly controlled, delivered and financed: 99.6 
per cent in 1979-80 and 97 per cent in 2007-08 (Edmiston, 2011). In fact, the 
proportion of social security that remained purely public (that is, publicly controlled, 
delivered and financed) increased from 57 to 65 per cent between 1979-80 and 1995-
96 and has steadily fallen since. The proportion of social security activity that was 
purely private fell between 1979-80 and 1995-96 from 19 to 16 per cent, and rose to 
22 per cent of welfare activity in 2007-08 (Edmiston, 2011).  
Privatisation is often interpreted as a euphemism for public sector cuts (Self, 2000; 
Walker, 1984). In reality though, social security privatisation in the UK has been 
coupled with a growth in social security provision since 1979. In real terms, social 
security spending has increased by 111 per cent (RPI adjusted) and has increased 
marginally from 16 to 16.7 per cent of GDP. Public social security spending has 
increased marginally from 12.9 to 13 per cent of GDP and private social security 
spending has increased from 3.1 to 3.7 per cent of GDP during the same period. 
Despite a growing body of literature pronouncing the tightening grip of fiscal austerity 
(Cox, 1998) and permeation of neoliberal economic dogma (Self, 2000), it appears that 
privatisation trends have not lead to a reduction in public investment or expenditure in 
social security. It is therefore important to resist the idea that privatisation results in 
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either, a reduction in social security spending, or, a linear transformation of public 
goods into private commodities. The mixed economy of welfare is exactly that - a 
confluence of actors controlling, delivering and financing different features of welfare 
activity. The following discussion then explores the procedural effects of privatisation 
on social security provision and services. 
 
Private provision and contracting-out  
 
First to be considered is the provision of social security. The most fundamental 
objection to privatisation is not so much the effects of it but the capacity to articulate 
social rights accrued from previously public services. Underpinning this argument is a 
belief that social goods are only ‘valuable if provided by the state’ (Dorfman and Harel, 
2013: 69). Once social goods are provided by an actor other than the state, they lose 
their status as public goods. Namely, once provided by a non-state actor the right to a 
minimum income is mediated by factors other than moral or social imperatives (Taylor-
Gooby et al., 2004). Private actors involved in the provision of social security potentially 
compromise the status of social security rights which in turn alters their substance. 
Whilst this may have repercussions for welfare activity that is privately financed, it is 
not so clear whether this is problematic for private provision in itself, or whether its fall-
out effects impinge more on the right to a minimum income. 
Between 1979 and 2008, the proportion of social security that was privately 
administered fluctuated but rose marginally from 33 to 34 per cent (Edmiston, 2011). 
Pension provision on the other hand has diversified considerably with the proportion of 
pension activity delivered by private providers rising from 46 to 56 per cent during the 
same period. This is largely explained by a substantial growth in occupational, personal 
and stakeholder pensions. During the 29 year period, spending on occupational 
pensions increased from £20.8 billion to £40 billion. Spending on personal and 
stakeholder pensions increased from £717 million to £10.1 billion. In total, this private 
pension provision accounted for 27.1 per cent of total pension activity in 1979-80 and 
35.9 per cent in 2007-08. Alongside this, expenditure on the basic state pension 
increased from £32 billion to £49.7 billion, but as a proportion of all pension activity, 
decreased from 40.2 per cent to 35.6 per cent (Edmiston, 2011). As previously stated, 
the real value of the basic state pension relative to average earnings has fallen 
substantially over time. As a result, many people are supplementing and drawing upon 
alternative pension provision through private means. The state has fostered such a 
process through a variety of tax reliefs, rebates and incentive payments which in itself 
accounts for a significant real-term growth in publicly funded, private pension activity. 
As such, the ability to secure a minimum income independent of the market has 
become increasingly difficult with people’s pension receipt more closely reflecting their 
previous employment status and earnings record. To this extent, the growth in private 
pension provision is as much a symptom as it is a cause of the worsening right to social 
security upon retirement.  
For those advancing an instrumental case for privatisation, contracted-out private 
provision enables greater flexibility, efficiency, and a more client-centred approach to 
service provision (NAO, 2013). Reviews of the evidence suggest that private provision 
‘works in that the firms become more efficient, more profitable, financially healthier, 
and reward investors’ (Netter and Megginson, 2001: 329; Brudney et al., 2005). 
However, many opponents of privatisation suggest that ‘contracting-out can have a 
depressive effect upon the quality of services without any formal breach of contract’ 
(Self, 2000: 115). Grover (2009: 504) also illustrates how the contracting out of 
employment assistance services has the ‘potential to reinforce, rather than alleviate 
labour market disadvantage’. Blomqvist (2004) suggests that private provision is 
problematic because it is informed by a profit logic so that access, coverage and quality 
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of services becomes stratified according to existing socio-economic and political 
divisions: namely ‘contracting out’ fails to shield service users against inequalities 
arising from the market. As recognised by Burchardt and Hills (1997), private provision 
may increase efficiency i.e. value for money, but it does not increase productivity i.e. a 
greater fulfilment of social rights. Considine et al. (2011) found that private provision 
achieved neither greater efficiency nor productivity. In fact, granted the same 
flexibilities, public provision of services and goods is able to match, if not surpass the 
quality and efficiency outcomes of private providers (Davies, 2008).  
In 2012-13, central and local government spent more than £4.3 billion and the 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) spent more £467 million buying goods and 
services from Serco, G4S, Capita and Atos (NAO, 2013). These four major contractors 
provide a range of goods and services that procedurally and/or substantively affect the 
right to social security. Taking the consultancy and professional services company Atos 
as an example, a significant proportion of their DWP contracts are dedicated towards 
work capability assessments and the eventual transition from Disability Living 
Allowance to Personal Independence Payments. Atos is not so much involved in the 
direct provision of social security in this instance, but rather in the administrative 
adjudication over its entitlement. Atos has come under increasing criticism for 
restricting the benefit entitlements of those they deem fit to work. As a private 
contractor, many view its treatment of disability and social security recipients as 
inhumane (DPAC, 2012). Prima facie, this seems to be the impact of private control 
and provision in welfare activity. However, this underestimates the extent to which the 
state is complicit in functioning according to market and/or ideological ends. Research 
suggests that public institutions tend to prioritise cost-savings over quality 
improvements when commissioning goods and services from private contractors 
(Brudney, 2005). DWP arrived at ‘statistical norms’ which translate into predefined 
targets to reduce the number of claimants on Employment Support Allowance and 
Disability Living Allowance (Franklin, 2013). As a result, Atos is compelled under 
contract to meet, as best as possible, such targets. Whilst, the privatisation of provision 
may be problematic for the right to social security, the ideological position that informs 
such a process may also be. By contracting out employment assistance and 
entitlement administration services, the state devolves part of their bureaucratic and 
political responsibility to contractors. To some extent, once a service is contracted out, 
the state is granted a level of democratic immunity from service failures. Contracting 
out then has the potential to procedurally affect the right to social security and limit the 
capacity for mechanistic and judicial redress. However, the high level of appeals 
against Atos decisions (DWP, 2014) illustrates how the extent of service failure and 
democratic immunity is not so much determined by the contractor, but by the state 
itself. Whether the state maintains control of service provision then, greatly determines 
the extent to which private provision can manipulate moral or social objectives to the 
logic of the market. 
 
Private control and regulation 
 
Between 1979 and 2008, the proportion of all social security welfare activity that 
was controlled by private actors fell from 42 to 38 per cent (Edmiston, 2011). In spite 
of increased private provision and finance in social security, the managerial state 
(Clarke and Newman, 1997) has maintained and extended its control in social security 
activity. The picture is somewhat different for pensions, with the proportion of pension 
activity that was privately controlled increasing from 59 to 64 per cent between 1979 
and 2008 (Edmiston, 2011).  
Very few, if any, core social security services and transfers are controlled by a fully 
autonomous system of regulation separate from public and institutional accountability. 
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In a somewhat self-defeating logic, private regulation of social security can only be 
granted by the state, and even then the extent of control is dictated by public 
monitoring. Indeed, privatisation depends ‘on the choices of policymakers, for example 
with respect to the financial conditions and legal restraints under which private actors 
are allowed to operate’ (Blomqvist, 2004: 152-153). Frequently, it is not so much 
absolute private control that affects entitlement to social security; it is institutional 
discretion within the confines of state regulation that has the most significant impact. 
This is not something that is readily quantifiable. Such functions of social security are 
not generally captured in data on privatisation trends but importantly these discretions 
often result in the largest public service failures.  
Looking at welfare to work services, the Work Programme can be seen as a prime 
example of how private discretion rather than control can affect the quality of 
provisions and the resultant right to social security. The Work Programme mandates 
certain groups to undertake work-related obligations in order to receive social security 
payments. In itself, this compromises the right to secure a minimum income 
independently of engagement or proximity to the paid labour market for some citizens. 
However, when targets are designed for private contractors, but a level of discretion is 
allowed, the right to social security is further threatened. The most recent available 
evaluations suggest that current providers are underperforming against contractual 
expectations (CESI, 2014). In addition though, evidence from initial evaluations of the 
Work Programme suggest that ‘creaming’ and ‘parking’ are prevalent across 
contractors (Newton et al., 2012). ‘Creaming’ occurs when those already close to the 
labour market are assisted into work with little investment or support required. 
‘Parking’ occurs when those furthest away from the labour market who require greater 
support and assistance in moving closer to paid employment, are neglected and efforts 
focused on those that will generate greatest revenue for the contractor. Rees et al. 
(2014) conclude this is driven substantially by cost and profit pressures. Ultimately, 
this occurs because market objectives win out over social and policy objectives (Twine, 
1994: 90). Operating according to market mechanisms is a case in point of how the 
quality of services and provisions are compromised by privatisation trends. 
Consequently, it would seem that publicly sanctioned private discretion and a lack of 
democratic accountability significantly determine how and who is subject to re-
commodification measures.  
Both institutional and individual actors are involved in private decision-making in 
social security. Decision-making for individual actors is principally restricted to those 
maximising their own cash benefits, tax reliefs or incentive rebates. It may reasonably 
be thought that individual actors having control over these decisions doesn’t 
substantively (or perhaps, directly) affect the right to social security. Indeed, research 
with those reliant on basic social security payments suggests that individual private 
control has little relevance to their experience of social security (Dwyer, 2000). 
However, this is largely explained by virtue of the fact that individual private decision-
making in social security tends only to be an option for those with greater resources at 
their disposal. Again, this demonstrates how the role of private actors can adversely 
affect the stratification of welfare; so that transfers are distributed more according to 
existing capital rather than needs. This significantly affects the changing distribution of 
social security and is considered later in this paper. It is important to recognise here 
though that this has profound implications for the discursive conception of social 
security (Cox, 1998). By opening up the option for private actors to control, dictate and 
maximise their social security entitlement (primarily in the realm of pensions in this 
instance), social transfers are reduced to any other commodity to be bid and competed 
for in the market. Those with more resources at their disposal will have more control 
over their social security receipt which leads us to consider the role and significance of 
private finance in social security. 
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Private finance and marketisation 
 
By its very nature, social security collectivises and redistributes a variety of risks so 
that these are shared across time and the citizenry. Life course, intergenerational and 
class risks are all minimised by a publicly funded system of social security (Esping-
Andersen, 1990: 40-43). Private finance of social security then appears inherently at 
odds with the objectives of social security, because it individualises risk, disabling 
effective recourse from impoverishment for the majority subject to it. According to 
Richard Titmuss (1968: 129), private finance compromises the right to social security 
because its receipt is either stratified according to existing financial resources or its 
receipt is so imbued with stigma that claiming becomes prohibitive. However, 
differential contribution to and receipt of social security has always existed and to a 
great extent, is a fundamental and necessary feature of the welfare system overall.  
Between 1979 and 2008, the proportion of social security that was privately 
financed rose from 19 to 22 per cent. Owing to occupational, personal and stakeholder 
pensions this figure rose from 27 to 35 per cent for pensions during the same period 
(Edmiston, 2011). Private financing has increased but it has not risen so significantly 
as to facilitate a wholesale commodification of the right to social security. For those 
purchasing unemployment protection insurance or private pensions, this may certainly 
be the case, but this could be either out of choice or because their resources are so in 
excess of the maximum threshold that their entitlement to social security (and its 
utility) is diminished. The vast majority of private spending on social security is on 
pensions and as such, this spending is accompanied by universal benefits. At present, 
these universal benefits are available irrespective of the financial capital of an 
individual. So, even for those happy to commodify their right to social security, there is 
still partial de-commodification through the basic state pension and other initiatives 
such as the winter fuel allowance. There may be qualitative repercussions for an 
individual being able to ‘purchase’ unemployment protection insurance or private 
pensions. However, social rights are only currently designed to impose modifications on 
the market rather than completely overhaul it (Marshall, [1950] 1992). If social rights 
were designed to do this, then any presence of private finance may compromise their 
substance. As it stands, private finance exists alongside a very large, publicly funded 
system of social security. Owing to their position in the labour market, recipients of 
social security state that they cannot afford private welfare insurance but that this has 
little bearing on their own lives because a publicly funded system of provision already 
exists (Dwyer, 2000: 107). It could be suggested then, that privately funded social 
security is only a problem for those willing to buy it. 
A very small proportion of UK citizens entirely fund their own welfare (Burchardt and 
Propper, 1999). For those concerned about the qualitative implications of this, it would 
appear that this sort of behaviour and activity doesn’t undermine collectivist principles. 
Those belonging to this ‘private welfare class’ have just as much support for universal 
benefits and public services as other citizens  (Burchardt and Propper, 1999). Equally 
for users of public services, private finance in social security isn’t necessarily deemed 
as problematic because on occasion it can enable citizens to maximise the social 
security available to them (Dwyer, 2000). Take-up and contribution to the (now defunct) 
Child Trust Fund can be seen as an example of this. Undoubtedly, private finance 
threatens the conceptual cogency of the right to social security: as it rearticulates a 
public social good as a private market commodity for some. This has challenged the 
rationalities of social security so that those with sufficient financial capital have been 
able to capitalise on increased social security expenditure. However, this is borne out 
more by the permeation of market principles in social security than a growth in private 
finance alone as illustrated below.  
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Social security privatisation: a means to whose end? 
 
Rising poverty and inequality are primarily explained by factors endogenous to social 
security privatisation (Joyce and Sibieta, 2013). Indeed as illustrated above, the 
institutional features of social security have proven largely resistant to welfare 
pluralism. Nevertheless, studies mapping the significance of privatisation tend to 
suggest that the resultant transformation of welfare services ‘is of a qualitative, rather 
than quantitative nature’ (Blomqvist, 2004: 151). The extent of social security 
privatisation has not changed dramatically overall since 1979, but it would appear that 
a considerable shift has occurred in how we conceptualise the right to social security 
(Cox, 1998). Private provision, control and finance can be seen as an institutional 
expression of this trend. However, a ‘privatisation ethos’ has proven more pervasive in 
transforming the status and efficacy of social security provisions.  
This ‘privatisation ethos’ has embedded market principles into ostensibly public 
social security arrangements. Many have argued that privatisation in social security 
means entitlements are reduced to any other form of property – a resource to be 
competed and bid for by both providers and recipients of social security (Dilley, 2000: 
982).  Whilst, this may be true in certain instances, this misrepresents the nature of 
welfare pluralism and the extent to which the existing income or capital of claimants 
has a bearing on social security entitlement and distribution. A more nuanced 
examination suggests that a ‘privatisation ethos’ is characterised by multiple factors 
that have a bearing on social security receipt. Factors typically affecting the allocation 
of market resources have become increasingly influential in shaping social security 
distribution. The existing income or capital of claimants is of course significant here, 
particularly in pension provision. However, other factors dominant in the market sphere 
such as knowledge, social capital and proficiency also have a bearing. In this sense, 
privatisation has had significant discursive repercussions on the right to social security 
whereby a ‘competent citizen is the successful consumer, able to get the best out of 
services’ (Dean, 2002: 18). Those equipped with the necessary knowledge of benefit 
regulations and the ability and resilience to negotiate administrative structures are 
best positioned to secure their social security entitlements. This is borne out in the 
changing distribution of social security. The permeation of market principles into 
welfare activity has affected the distribution of social security entitlements and 
payments such that resources are not being directed towards those most in need of 
them. Looking at three income groups across five time periods, it is apparent that 
social security provision has become notably less progressive in the (re-) distribution of 
financial resources since 1979 (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Average proportion of gross income from direct cash benefits for three groups 
across the income distribution, 1979 to 2012 
Source: ONS (2013), author’s own analysis 
 
Expressed as a share of gross income, the above table shows the average amount 
of direct cash benefits received by households at the bottom, middle and top of the 
income distribution. Existing literature suggests that the middle classes have been the 
  Bottom 20% Middle 20% Top 20% 
1979-80 72.2% 12.8% 3.1% 
1995-96 68.4% 19.2% 2.8% 
1999-00 65.9% 18.7% 2.0% 
2007-08 61.3% 19.2% 4.3% 
2011-12 57.7% 23.9% 3.0% 
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biggest beneficiaries of public healthcare and education services (Matthews and 
Hastings, 2013). Table 2 shows that those in the middle of the income distribution 
have also been the biggest beneficiaries of increased social security expenditure since 
1979. In 1979-80, those in the middle of the income distribution received on average 
12.8 per cent of their gross income via direct cash benefits. By 2011-12, this rose to 
23.9 per cent. During the same period, the average share of gross income derived from 
direct cash benefits for those at the lower end of the income distribution fell from 72.2 
to 57.7 per cent. Between 1979 and 2012, the income ratio between the 90th and 
10th percentile of the income distribution rose from 3.1 to 3.9, the income ratio 
between the 90th and 50th percentile rose from 1.7 to 2.0 and perhaps most 
significantly the income ratio between the 50th and 10th percentile rose from 1.8 to 
1.9 (Crawford et al., 2013). In spite of considerable increases in expenditure, social 
security instruments have not only failed to reduce poverty and income inequality 
between the extreme ends of the income distribution, they have also failed to close the 
gap between the bottom and middle. 
This trend in itself has not caused rising poverty and inequality, but it has done little 
to address such a phenomenon. To a great extent, the ‘privatisation ethos’ has left 
social security instruments less effectual in addressing inequalities arising from the 
market. The ‘privatisation ethos’ has shaped the utility and substance of social 
security; particularly for those most in need of it. Many have critiqued privatisation 
processes as problematic because they do not distribute resources according to need 
(Titmuss, 1968; Walker, 1984; Cox, 1998). This is quite evidently the case here but it is 
not so much the absence of a moral imperative to address need that explains the 
detrimental effect of privatisation. Rather, it is the presence of a more salient priority to 
introduce market principles into the public services sphere. The rise of consumer 
citizen identities (Clarke et al., 2005) has enabled those with the most financial and 
non-financial resources at their disposal to capitalise on social security provision. For 
example, middle income groups have disproportionately benefited from child benefit, 
disability living allowance and attendance allowance since 1979 (ONS, 2013). In 
nominal terms, middle income groups have consistently received a greater amount of 
these benefits compared to those at the lower end of the income distribution (ONS, 
2013). The extent to which this group receives more has risen substantially since 1979 
with factors such as knowledge, proficiency and resilience becoming increasingly 
significant in the stratification of public resources (Clarke et al., 2007). 
Importantly, it is not only market factors that dictate the appropriation and 
distribution of social security according to vested interests. Political power has perhaps 
an equal, if not more profound, effect. Various studies have shown that those most 
able to wield political power over social policies and provision are the greatest 
beneficiaries of public services (Le Grand and Winter, 2000; Manow, 2009; Matthews 
and Hastings, 2013). Underlying consumer citizen practices then, the vested interests 
of the politically engaged electorate shape the extent and distribution of social security 
entitlements. Meltzer and Richard (1981: 924) argue that redistributive outcomes are 
greatly determined by the ‘welfare maximising choice of decisive individuals’. Median 
voter theory suggests that rising inequality precipitates increased rates of redistribution 
via median voter preferences. However, the changing distribution of social security 
receipt has to some extent buffered the effects of rising inequality on median (and thus 
decisive) voters. Alongside this, hardening attitudes towards welfare (Park et al., 2012) 
and the rising identity of consumer citizens (Clarke et al., 2005) amplifies the 
‘privatisation ethos’ and its effects. In its various permutations, Tax Credits can be seen 
as an example of this. In 1977, only those at the lower end of the income distribution 
were entitled to Family Credit: on average, the bottom 20 per cent of households 
received £3 a year in provisions. By 1986, this increased to an average of £20 a year, 
and £103 a year by 1995-96. During the same period, entitlement extended to those 
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in the middle of the income distribution with these households receiving on average £5 
a year in 1986 and £43 a year in 1995-96. In an attempt to address rising poverty and 
inequality (attendant to other policy objectives), Tax Credits became an increasingly 
important feature of social security under New Labour. To sustain support for increased 
social security expenditure, Tax Credit entitlement extended drastically so that the 
material benefits of increased expenditure were manifest and justifiable to median 
voters (Dean, 2013). By 2011-12, households at the bottom (20 per cent) of the 
income distribution received £1,253 a year in Tax Credits on average, whilst 
households in the middle (20 per cent) of the income distribution received £654 a year 
on average.  
Such developments have led to a system of social security provision that 
increasingly manages voters’ wants rather than citizens’ needs. The decoupling of 
social rights from civil and political rights compromises the share of social security 
received by those at the bottom end of the income distribution, whilst protecting  (and 
indeed expanding) the social security entitlements of those in the middle (Barr, 2012). 
However much a market ethos is present in public services, legislative entitlement is 
the ultimate dictate of social security receipt. After all, claimants can only bid for goods 
if they are let into the auction house. Accordingly, caution should be taken not to 
overstate the extent to which privatisation trends have reduced the right to social 
security to any other form of property. As previously discussed, this would only reflect 
one extreme end of the welfare continuum. It would appear that a fulfilment of the right 
to social security is dictated not so much by fundamental needs, but by individual 
ability to exert consumer interests and democratic power in the public sphere. As a 
result, the logic of privatisation has fed into the structuring and administration of social 
security to undermine its utility. Not only is privatisation and the ethos informing it 
compromising the right to social security for those most in need of it; those least in 
need of it are actually benefiting from this process also.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Despite political rhetoric and will since 1979, shifts made towards privatisation have 
been gradual and the majority of social security activity remains publicly controlled, 
delivered and financed. Nevertheless, this paper has illustrated that both privatisation 
processes and the permeation of market principles into the public services sphere 
have weakened the capacity for social security to address rising poverty and inequality.  
Control, delivery and finance all have a mutually contingent and reinforcing bearing 
on the right to social security. One has to explore how they interact to understand their 
respective and collective effects. In doing so, this paper has illustrated that 
privatisation has procedurally and thus substantively affected the right to social 
security. Market principles have come to feature in social security provisions that, 
ostensibly at least, remain public. The ‘privatisation ethos’ that has informed minor 
shifts in the regulation, provision, and funding of social security has also come to shape 
the increasingly regressive distribution of social security transfers. Not only has the 
efficacy of social security expenditure been compromised, but importantly the logic of 
privatisation has altered the nature and interpretation of the right to social security 
(Dean, 2002). The ‘privatisation ethos’ and its procedural and institutional 
manifestations increase the mandate of those with democratic influence and (non-) 
financial resources to maximise the social security they receive. In this sense, rather 
than guaranteeing a minimum income independent of the labour market to fulfil citizen 
needs, social security has increasingly come to supplement income based on labour 
market participation to maximise consumer citizen wants. 
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The Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government concede that public 
services are often poorly targeted and inegalitarian (Cabinet Office, 2011). With a 
renewed commitment to opening up public services to market competition, it would 
appear that the distribution of social security is set to become increasingly regressive. 
Growth in social security spending may have tempered some of the negative effects 
since 1979, but fiscal austerity is set to further threaten the content, substance and 
justiciability of the right to social security.  
 
 
Notes 
 
1 Depending on the ethic of need assumed, social security can do anything from meet 
basic survival requirements to enable effective human flourishing (Dean, 2010). 
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